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Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity  
By Tim Maudlin  
It is sometimes stated that composite quantum systems in entangled states are 
fundamentally ‘non-local’(i.e. a measurement on one component system can affect a space-
like separated system ‘instantaneously’) and therefore, non-relativistic quantum mechanics 
violates Relativity theory. This conclusion is usually thought to follow directly from Bell's 
Theorem in quantum mechanics and the upper limit on velocities provided by the speed of 
light in Relativity. But exactly what if the conflict between the kind of non-locality exhibited 
by entangled quantum systems and either the Special or General Theory of Relativity? 
Maudlin's Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity is a beautifully crafted book that attempts 
to answer this question by evaluating four purported restrictions imposed by Relativity. He 
also considers four attempts to formulate Lorentz invariant quantum theories and 
concludes that such accounts exact a high philosophical price. Maudlin has achieved his 
first goal: he gives a lucid exposition of the tension between quantum non-locality and 
Relativity theory which is accessible to the non-specialist. But is there a high philosophical 
price to be paid for Lorentz invariant quantum theories and can we afford it?  
Maudlin sets the stage in the first two chapters by introducing the ‘non-locality’of 
entangled quantum systems and the Special Theory of Relativity respectively. The 
mysteries of entangled states surface through Maudlin's version of the EPR thought-
experiment: two people, who cannot communicate after leaving a common room by 
opposite doors, are asked questions which correspond to detector settings. The challenge is 
to construct a strategy for answering the questions that reproduces the behaviour of 
correlated pairs of photons. Maudlin uses the impossibility of this task to illustrate that the 
‘quantum connection’is curious because it is unattenuated, discriminating and 
instantaneous. This chapter also contains an appendix on the Greenberger, Home, Zeilinger 
(GHZ) thought-experiment which shows that demonstrating non-locality need not involve 
the complications of a statistical argument. Maudlin's introduction to Special Relativity 
contains many helpful diagrams and carefully hones the reader's relativistic intuitions by 
discussing common paradoxes and misunderstandings. For example, the chapter closes by 
considering various answers (ranging from incorrect to correct) to the question:‘What 
would it be like to travel at 99.99% the speed of light? (p. 57). 
Each of the next four chapters is dedicated to one of the four restrictions, often 
claimed to follow from Relativity, on superluminal mass-energy transfer, signalling, 
causation and information exchange. Maudlin argues that the Bell inequalities do not entail 
that there is superluminal mass-energy exchange between the two wings of an EPR type 
experiment. However the Bell inequalities do entail that, even though we cannot identify 
which event is the cause and which is the effect, the two wings of the experiment are 
‘causally implicated’because they satisfy the requisite counterfactuals. So while we cannot 
say that ‘this event superluminally caused that event’we can say that there must have been 
superluminal causation. Yet, perhaps the most interesting aspect of the book is his 
discussion of superluminal signalling and superluminal information exchange. How can 
Maudlin claim that while there is no superluminal signalling, there is superluminal 
information exchange? 
For Maudlin, signalling is an anthropocentric notion that involves a nomic 
connection between a controllable transmitter and an observable of the receiver. Thus, the 
question of superluminal signalling reduces to: “Can manipulations of the polarizer on one 
wing of the experiment produce a noticeable effect on the other, given that the Bell 
inequalities are violated?” (p. 82). The negative answer to this question is well-
known:‘there is no Bell telephone’. For Maudlin, however, to claim that there is no 
superluminal signalling is not to say that no information flows between the two wings of 
the experiment. The amount of information exchanged between transmitter and receiver is 
a measure of how much one can infer about the state of the former from the state of the 
latter. Notice that information can be exchanged even if we cannot control the information 
being transmitted. Maudlin's clever calculation shows that the quantum statistics can be 
reproduced if a pair of photons exchanges, on average, just over 1 bit of information. And as 
Maudlin himself points out, the systems must be capable of exchanging an infinite amount 
of information at least some of the time. 
Maudlin argues that we can determine how much information is exchanged between 
the two wings of an EPR type experiment without concerning ourselves with the details of 
the communication channel. Conspicuously absent from this discussion of the ‘studied 
agnosticism’afforded by the study of information exchange is the claim that information, 
just like signalling, is anthropocentric. And this may affect our appraisal of ‘information 
exchange’between the two wings of the experiment. When we ask ‘how much does a 
photon need to know …?”, we are implicitly assuming that the photon carries a sort of table 
(viz. that there are ‘hidden variables’) such that given the information about its distant 
partner, the photon can change its physical state in the appropriate way so that it is either 
passed or absorbed. This in turn assumes what Maudlin himself elsewhere criticises: that 
detectors are entirely passive in the measurement interaction. Also, one wonders how 
strongly Maudlin's calculation of the amount of information exchange depends on the 
statistical characteristics of the EPR set up. Could a similar calculation be carried out for the 
particles in the GHZ thought-experiment? And if so, what would such a result indicate? 
After showing that the Bell inequalities entail superluminal causation and 
superluminal information exchange, Maudlin shows that whether we consider ‘collapse’or 
‘no-collapse’ theories, it seems there is a high philosophical price to pay for a Lorentz 
invariant quantum theory. Under the rubric of ‘collapse’ theories, Maudlin considers 
Cramer's transactional interpretation and Fleming's hyperplane dependence 
interpretation. His exposition of Fleming's view is careful and ensures that non-specialists 
will not be led astray by talk of systems which differ depending on what hyperplane is 
considered. However, he leaves the reader with the impression that Fleming's view solves 
the problem of Lorentz invariance ‘by a radical generosity”: a given photon can be both in a 
state of definite polarisation with respect to one hyperplane and a state of indefinite 
polarisation with respect to another hyperplane. But for Fleming, this unlikely and 
profligate ontology is a consequence of his theory and not a premise used to solve the 
problem. What Maudlin has not told us is why, if Fleming's view is a ‘good’ scientific theory, 
we should question the theory's metaphysical implications rather than our intuitions. 
Since the problem of Lorentz invariance seems linked to wave collapse, are ‘no-
collapse’ theories unproblematic? Maudlin considers Bohm's theory and Albert and 
Loewer's Many Minds interpretation and concludes that these theories are also not Lorentz 
invariant. Most notably, Maudlin shows how problems with Lorentz invariance get 
smuggled into Bohm's theory. He points out that a preferred notion of simultaneity is 
inherited by the Bohm theory through the notion of ‘configuration’. This, I think, is a 
valuable point that is often overlooked: “Configurations are configurations at a time, they 
specify where all the particles in a system are at a given moment. So the very notion of a 
configuration is not a Lorentz invariant concept” (p. 216). So long as we are employing a 
‘classical’ configuration space, attempts to construct a Lorentz invariant theory are doomed 
to failure. Unfortunately, one is left wondering why Special Relativity can represent 
configurations of physical systems and still have a Lorentz invariant theory while this 
seems impossible for the kind of configuration space used by the Bohm theory. Also, are 
representations of quantum systems in Hilbert space in orthodox quantum mechanics also 
susceptible to this problem? 
The last chapter concludes with a clear introduction to the main tenets of General 
Relativity and a discussion of the problems encountered by these views in that setting. The 
book concludes with a brief chapter entitled ‘Morals’ where Maudlin states the main results 
of his book and concludes: “Quantum Theory and Relativity seem not to directly contradict 
one another, but neither can they be easily reconciled” (p. 242). Though this is not a 
particularly ‘novel’ result (it has been implicit in the literature for some time), his book is a 
valuable contribution to the philosophy of quantum mechanics because it concretely 
analyses what has become accepted dogma regarding the conflict between quantum non-
locality and relativity. 
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